Abstract-Network-based crime has been increasing in both extent and severity and network-based forensics encapsulates an essential part of legal surveillance. A key network forensics tool is traceback, which can be used to identify true sources of suspects. Both accuracy and secrecy are essential attributes of a successful forensic traceback. In this paper, we present a class of hoppingbased spread-spectrum techniques for forensic traceback, which fully use the benefits of the spread spectrum approach and preserves a greater degree of secrecy. Our proposed techniques, including Code Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (CH-DSSS), Frequency Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (FH-DSSS), and Time Hopping-Spread Spectrum (TH-DSSS), operate to randomize the effects of marking traffic through both the time and frequency domains. Our simulation study validates these techniques in terms of accuracy and secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we address the issue of developing efficient forensic traceback techniques to deal with cyber crimes through anonymous communication networks. Societies in todays world are more dependent on the cyber space, in which commercial and military activities are realized. However, it has also led to cyber security issues. As the number of cyber crimes has been increasing with the convergent and fast growing cyber world, the network forensics plays a more important role to support legal surveillance.
Our focus in this paper is addressing the issue of one category of anonymous cyber-attack scenes described below. Particularly, valuable network services for anonymous communication, such as Tor [1] and Anonymizer [2] , can enhance privacy by supporting anonymous publishing and browsing, and protect users from malicious eavesdroppers. However, such anonymous communication systems can be subverted and used for crime, including illegal file sharing or child pornography distribution. Terrorists or other conspirators can abuse those anonymous network services as well. Cyber activities pose new challenges for law enforcement that uses digital forensics to combat the growing number of anonymous cyber crimes. For example, cyber terrorists may communicate and share information through anonymous communication networks.
To address these cyber issues, we develop network forensic traceback techniques to identify anonymous enemies in the challenging cyber-attack scene. As most anonymous nodes do not keep necessary logs for forensic investigations in the aftermath of attacks, defending against such dynamic and anonymous enemies requires real-time data collection, analysis and response. One fundamental network-based forensic technique is traceback [3] , [4] . Both accuracy and secrecy of traceback are essential for successful network forensics. Accurate traceback makes surveillance possible, while traceback secrecy prevents suspects from realizing that they are under surveillance. To achieve those goals, the spread spectrum based traceback technique was initiated in [4] . In this approach, spread spectrum (SS) is a transmission technique, which uses a pseudo-noise (PN) code, independent of the original data signal, to "spread" the signal during the data transmission. On reception, the signal is recovered ("despread") by making use of the same PN code. Spread spectrum techniques are resistant to interference and interception. Yu et al. [4] proposed a direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) based traceback technique, and demonstrated strengths of spread spectrum approaches to conduct network traceback. In this traceback technique, investigators modulate a suspect's traffic flow rate using a secret PN code. The moderately changed traffic rate does not show any obvious regularity such as the periodic pattern [5] . Although the DSSS-based traceback technique in [4] has the above benefits, we have determined that it is vulnerable to detection and cannot preserve traceback secrecy against attacks even when cryptographically secure PN codes are used [6] .
In this paper, we study a class of hopping-based spread spectrum techniques for network forensic traceback that benefits the spread spectrum approach and preserves a greater degree of secrecy. We provide a generic framework for applying the hopping technique into spread spectrum, which are robust, accurate, and covert to secretly trace illegal cyber activities. Under this framework, we develop three new hopping based spread spectrum traceback techniques, including Code Hopping-DSSS (CH-DSSS), Frequency Hopping DSSS (FH-DSSS), and Time Hopping DSSS (TH-DSSS). Our developed techniques are inherently less prone to interception and detection by a third party. Traceback schemes based on these techniques can randomize the traffic pattern in the frequency and the time domain to a markedly greater extent than DSSS alone. We also discuss the secrecy of our proposed hopping-based spread spectrum forensic traceback techniques. For the secrecy, we consider one recently discovered attack [6] , which is able to detect DSSS marks using determination coefficient of traffic rate on the marked flow. Through simulation study, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our developed techniques, in terms of preserving traceback secrecy against attacks and achieving a high traceback accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work. In Section III, we present our new hopping-based spread spectrum techniques for network traceback. In Section IV, we show the performance evaluation to validate our findings. We conclude this paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Mix networks [7] have been used by anonymous communication systems such as Tor as shown in Figure 1 . In a mix network, a sender routes packets through a series of mixes. There has been a number of research efforts on degrading anonymous communication through mix networks. The existing traffic analysis techniques against anonymous communication can categorized into two types: passive traffic analysis and active traffic analysis.
Passive traffic analysis techniques show that the traffic could be passively recorded and used to identify the similarity between Alice's outbound traffic and Bob's inbound traffic [8] , [9] . For example, Levine et al. [9] developed a cross correlation technique for measuring the similarity in the traffic between sender and receiver. The existing research efforts show that sensitive information can be recovered from encrypted network traffic through examining the patterns of packet size and timing [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . For example, Song et al. [10] investigated packet inter-arrival timing in SSHv1 connections to identify keystroke patterns and crack passwords. Wright et al. [13] studied the statistical distribution of packet sizes in encrypted voice over IP traffic and identified the language related patterns. Active traffic analysis techniques intend to embed specific secret signal (or marks) into the target traffic [3] , [4] , [14] , [15] . As an example, Yu et al. [4] proposed a flow marking scheme to secretly confirm the communication relationship through mix networks. The basic idea is as follows. To determine whether a sender is communicating with a receiver over the mix network, an investigator first selects a secret signal and each bit of a signal is spread by a secret PN code. By interfering with a senders outbound traffic and marginally varying its rate based on the spread signal, an investigator can embed such secret spread signal (denoted as marks) into the sender's outbound traffic. The embedded spread signal is carried along with the traffic from the sender to the receiver. A second investigator sniffs the receiver's inbound traffic. The spread signal is then extracted from the target traffic by a digital filter and the same PN code is used for despreading and retrieving the original signal. If the original signal is recovered at the receiver, the communication relationship is confirmed. There are other research efforts related to active traffic analysis techniques. For example, Murdoch et al. [15] investigated the timing-based active traffic analysis on Tor based on compromised Tor routers. Wang et al. [3] studied a timing-based watermarking scheme in identifying the encrypted peer-topeer voice over IP calls. Peng et al. [16] analyzed the secrecy of timing-based traffic analysis technique proposed in [14] . Kiyavash et al. [17] proposed a multi-flow approach to detect watermarks.
III. HOPPING-BASED SPREAD SPECTRUM TECHNIQUES
FOR NETWORK TRACEBACK Because of the secrecy of PN code, only those knowing the code could correctly recover the original signal and confirm the communication relationship. The PN code modulated signal appears as innocent noise in both the time and frequency domains, so it is difficult for others to detect the presence of such signal in the host traffic. Hence, using the DSSS technique, anonymous communication can be traced while evading detection by suspects. Nevertheless, the existing effort [6] showed that DSSS marks could be visible to suspects if they adopt determination coefficient to identify the selfsimilarity feature of the marked traffic. To address this issue, we propose a set of hopping-based spread spectrum techniques for conducting network traceback. In this following sections, we first present the framework for designing the hopping-based spread spectrum for network traceback, which can achieve both traceback accuracy and secrecy. We then introduce several techniques, including Code Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (CH-DSSS), Frequency HoppingDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum (FH-DSSS), and Time Hopping-Spread Spectrum (TH-DSSS). Figure 2 illustrates the general framework for hoppingbased spread spectrum for network traceback. The basic idea is illustrated as follows. The original signal x and a PN code are selected in the same way as [4] . Then, a hopping component directed by the hopping control code (HCC) is used to randomize the PN code. At the transmitter, each bit of a signal is spread through a random sequence controlled by HCC, then the spread signal is used to modulate traffic characteristics (e.g., traffic rate, timing, packet size, and others) and the signal is embedded into the target traffic. Note that even using the same PN code and original signal x, the actual spread sequence X used to modulate flow will be varied because of the randomization introduced by HCC. At the receiver, the spread signal is extracted from the target traffic by a digital filter and the same HCC and PN code are used for despreading and retrieving the original signal x. If the original signal x is recovered at the receiver, the communication relationship is confirmed. In the following, we introduce the detailed workflow. In the mark generation at the transmitter side, an original signal bit x of "+1" or "−1" is selected. To achieve a low false positive rate for network traceback, the original signal consists of multiple bits [4] . We define the operation of HCC as H(.). The transmitted baseband signal X can be written as X = xH(C t ), where C t is a PN code with chip duration t c . Note that the chip duration t hc of H(C t ) may be randomly changed for each chip according to the format of H. H(X) is then used to modulate a target traffic flow and embed marks. There are numerous ways to embed marks into traffic, including manipulating the flow rate [4] , the packet timing [18] , and the size of packet [19] . The following procedures show the case of embedding the marks into flow rate changes. When a chip is −1, strong interference is applied against the flow so that the flow has a low rate for t hc seconds. When a chip is +1, weak interference is applied against the flow, so that the flow has a higher rate for t hc seconds. If the flow has an average rate of D, then the high rate is D + A and the low rate is D − A, where A is the mark amplitude. The rate of the target traffic flow should be large enough for investigators to introduce marks. Hence, the transmitted signal T x (also denoted as DSSS marks or PN code modulated traffic) can be represented T x = AxH(C t ) + D. Then, the modulated traffic flow is transmitted through the Internet, where noise will be introduced by cross traffic or perhaps by intentional interference.
A. Framework
In the mark recognition at the receiver, we formulate the received signal R x = AxH(C t ) + D + ξ, where a random variable ξ is noise. A sniffer deployed at the receiver derives R x by capturing the traffic at the receiver and divides it into segments. Using traffic rate modulation as an example, each segment lasts for a chip duration of t hc seconds, and the average traffic rate of each segment can then be computed. The average rate for l continuous segments constitutes R x . The above procedures shows the case that marks are embedded into the flow rate changes. If marks are embedded into other traffic characteristics, the corresponding procedures need to be developed. Please refer to [19] for the further details in terms of recognizing marks in packet size. Then, a high-pass filter is applied on the received signal R x to remove the direct current component D from the received signal and a locally generated PN code C r and HCC directed by hopping module (which are the same as the PN code and HCC at the transmitter in the last paragraph) are used to despread the filtered received signal
, where · refers to the dot product operation. When C r = C t , we have H(C t ) · H(C r ) = 1 and ξ · H(C r ) = 0. Hence, the signal can be recovered based on a simple decision rule.
Note that the secrecy of hopping-based spread spectrum technique refers to the difficulty of detecting the traceback by anyone other than investigators and it is one important goal for network traceback technique. As indicated in [4] , the PN code itself, PN code length l, original signal length w, and chip duration T c , and mark amplitude A; impact how well network traceback can be conducted. In addition, our proposed hopping-based spread spectrum approach provides the following mechanisms for preserving a better secrecy: (i) The secrecy of HCC makes marks secret as the randomization introduced by HCC provides increased flexibility to make marks undetectable to suspects. Because suspects do not know HCC, it is very difficult for them to recognize the existence of marks in their traffic. (ii) The marks generated by hoppingbased spread spectrum show a white noise-like pattern in both time and frequency domains as well. The modulated traffic appears random for those who do not know the content of both HCC and PN code.
B. Our Proposed Techniques
As shown in Section III-A, the hopping component plays critical roles for preserving the secrecy of marks. In the following, we present three techniques: Code Hopping direct sequence spread spectrum (CH-DSSS), Frequency HoppingDirect Sequence Spread Spectrum (FH-DSSS), and Time Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (TH-DSSS).
1) Code Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (CH-DSSS):
In CH-DSSS, we use multiple codes to spread different signal bits at the transmitter. That is, the hopping module at the transmitter in Figure 2 selects from among multiple PN codes to spread each signal bit. This selection sequence is directed by the hopping control code (HCC). To recover the signal, the investigator at the receiver must use the same selection sequence of PN codes for conducting despreading based on HCC. As shown in Figure 3 , we use the following simple example to demonstrate the property of this scheme, which makes marks randomly embedded in the traffic flow. For example, investigators use code C 0 = {c 0 , · · · , c 4 } to spread signal bit x 0 (-1 or 1) and code C 1 = {c 0 , · · · , c 4 } to spread signal bit x 1 . If C 0 and C 1 are orthogonal PN codes, i.e., C 0 · C 1 = 0, then the dot product of two spread bits C 0 x 0 · C 1 x 1 = 0. As an ideal case, we use a different orthogonal code for each signal bit. One practical limitation is that if a too short of code is used, the number of orthogonal codes with the same length is inadequate. To overcome this, we can use codes with variable lengths. Another way to address the limited number of orthogonal codes is to collect a number of codes in a pool, then generate a pseudorandom sequence of selections from the pool to modulate the outgoing traffic. The receiver uses the same sequence of codes from the pool to demodulate the traffic. 
2) Frequency Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (FH-DSSS):
The frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) is also a popular spread technique in the wireless communications. In FHSS, signal bits are modulated and carried by different frequency bands or channels. As shown in Figure 4 , after communicating on one channel for a predefined small amount of time, the dwell time, the transmitter and receiver switch to another channel. As time goes, the synchronized transmitter and receiver communicate on a series of channels, known as the hopping sequence. The hopping sequence is controlled by a pseudorandom number sequence. In general, a channel from the hopping sequence comes from a hop set, a limited number of channels/frequencies used by the communication system. The technique of FHSS can escape detection effectively [20] . The output power of FHSS signals is spread over a large bandwidth and the spectrum has very low power spectral density. The low spectral density may not even be recognized as valid communication but instead appears to be noise.
We apply FHSS to conduct network traceback in the following way. At the transmitter in Figure 2a , the hopping module will vary the chip duration of a PN code, which is used for spreading a signal bit. The chip duration is generated by HCC, where each different chip duration corresponds to a different frequency. The spreading process is equivalent to modulating each signal bit to a different frequency channel. Consider the example illustrated in Figure 5 : a signal bit x 0 can be spread by a PN code C with a chip duration t 0 , denoted as C 0 , and another signal bit x 1 can be spread by the same PN code C with a different chip duration t 1 , denoted as C 1 . Hence, x 0 is analogous to transmitting at a frequency channel around f 0 = As shown in Figure 5 , for signal bits x 0 , · · · , x w−1 , we use a PN code with chip frequency f 0 to modulate x 0 , the same PN code with chip frequency f 1 to modulate x 1 , and so on. The ordered set of frequencies f 0 , · · · , f w−1 is the hopping sequence (HCC). To recover the signal at the receiver, an investigator could use the same sequence of frequencies controlled by the same HCC for conducting despreading as shown in Figure 2 . Theoretically, the hopping sequence can be infinite. In practice, we need to consider the limitations of flow duration. A low chip frequency implies a long chip duration, and requires a long interfering session to embed the spread signal into the target traffic. A more general form of FH-DSSS will vary the duration for each and every chip of PN code, rather than just varying chip durations at signal bit boundaries. This approach was used for our experiments.
3) Time Hopping-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (TH-DSSS):
The time hopping spread spectrum (THSS) can also be used to reduce the probability of interception and recognition [20] . Figure 6 illustrates the principle of THSS. For THSS, there is non-zero intervals between chips within a PN code. The duration of those intervals are varied according to the pseudo random control code (i.e., HCC). We implement THSS for network traceback in the following way. At the transmitter in Figure 2 , the hopping module will vary a PN code's interchip intervals, under the control of HCC. This spreading process spreads signal bits through time. Hence, PN codes used to spread each signal bit are actually different. As shown in Figure 7 , a chip is transmitted in a random position relative to a period T . The actual position of the chip within each interval T is determined by HCC. A variant of THSS is illustrated in Figure 7 . In this approach, a chip is transmitted in a random position relative to a period T . The actual position of the chip within each interval T is determined by HCC. To recover the signal at the receiver, an investigator can use the same sequence of PN codes with a corresponding variation of inter-chip intervals controlled by the same HCC for despreading as shown in Figure 2 . As we can see, the essential differences between FH-DSSS and TH-DSSS is that the TH-DSSS spreads signal bits through time rather than frequency. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we use ns-2 to conduct simulation and validate the effectiveness of our approach in terms of accuracy and secrecy. We have conducted a large number of simulations and only limited results are shown in this section because of the space limitation. Figure 8 gives the simulation topology. In Figure 8 , n 5 and n 7 are Tor-like mixes (no batching or reordering since they are not practical at all) as used in [4] . The target FTP flow runs from node n 0 to node n 8 throughout the simulations. There are also cross flows as noise for the duration of each simulation. In our simulation, the interferer uses UDP (User Datagram Protocol) based CBR (Constant Bit Rate) traffic to modulate the target FTP flow. The CBR traffic runs from n 1 to n 4 and is an on-off traffic source sharing the link between n 2 and n 3 with the target FTP flow. As we know from the TCP flowcontrol, when the CBR traffic rate increases, the FTP traffic rate decreases while when the CBR traffic rate decreases (e.g., no CBR traffic), the FTP traffic rate increases.
In our simulation, the CBR interference traffic is turned off when a chip within a signal modulated by the PN code is +1 and it is turned on when the chip is −1. The oninterval and off-interval are equal to the chip duration. In this way, we mark the interested FTP flow by adjusting its rate through the interference of the CBR traffic. To measure the accuracy of traceback, we use the traceback successful rate and traceback false positive rate. The traceback successful rate refers to the probability that marks are correctly recognized. The traceback false positive rate refers to the probability that marks are mistakenly recognized in the case, in which there is no spread signals embedded into the target traffic flow.
For measuring the secrecy of traceback, we use the detection rate P D and the false positive rate P F as our evaluation metrics. Recall we define the detection rate P D as the probability that traffic modulated by PN code is detected as traffic being traced. The false positive rate, P F , is the probability that unmarked traffic is misclassified as traffic being traced. The detection rate and false positive rate are illustrated in Figure  9 , where f 0 (x) is the distribution of features (averaging rate for the determination coefficient for the attack based on selfsimilarity analysis) distribution of traffic without marks, f 1 (x) the feature distribution of the traffic with marks, and γ is used to control the maximal tolerant false positive rate. We can see that detection rate P D and false positive rate P F have an interesting relationship. Both P D and P F decrease to zero as γ increases, while both P D and P F increase to one as γ declines. A common means of displaying the relationship between P D and P F is with the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is a plot of P D versus P F . In reality, when an adversary tries to detect traffic containing DSSS marks, a high detection rate and a low false positive rate would be expected. For the secrecy of network traceback, the ideal scenario is that the false positive rate is as high as the detection rate. Figure 10 shows the traceback false positive rate when we try to recognize a signal from traffic in which no marks exist (sender and receiver are not communicating). In our simulation, we vary signal length from 1 to 7, and for each fixed signal length, we measure the false positive rates for codes of different lengths (from 2 to 7). The false positive rate for each signal length is computed as the average of the "detection rate" for the different code lengths tested with that signal. From Figure 10 , we can see that the false positive rate decreases exponentially with the increasing signal length. The theoretical curve (from the result in [4] ) matches the empirical curve very well. Figure 7 (b) and the pulse refers to one spread bit. The interval between two pulses is between [1s, 5s]. It can be observed that with the three new traceback techniques, when the interfering traffic rate is high enough, the detection rate is 100%, while the false positive rate is also low in our simulation, consistent with results from [4] . However, there exists difference of detection rate by the three approaches. ROC Showing Accuracy of Hopping-based Spread Spectrum Techniques Figure 12 shows results of CH/FH/TH-DSSS for preserving traceback secrecy against the attack based on self-similarity analysis: we use two m-sequence codes of length 7 to randomly modulate the signal, the windows size is 3 and the number of segments in each window is 2. We can see that the empirical ROC curve approaches the ideal ROC curve for secrecy: as the detection rate increases, the false positive rate appears approximately linearly. For example, given a small false positive rate (i.e., 5%), the detection rate is also very small (i.e., 25%). This renders the detection results untrustworthy and the secrecy of network traceback is preserved. We also observe that the simulations for the CH-DSSS, FH-DSSS and TH-DSSS based techniques for network traceback have similar observations. In this paper, we proposed a set of hopping-based spreadspectrum techniques for conducting network forensic traceback, which takes the benefit of the spread spectrum approach and preserves a great degree of traceback secrecy. Because our approach can spread signal bits through time and frequency domains and make it does not fall prey to the statistical traffic analysis attack. Our simulations validate that our proposed hopping-based spread spectrum techniques can accurately and secretly trace the suspects using anonymous communication.
